AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, IN THE
REAL COURTS OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION (DISCOUNTING THE
KANGAROO COURTS OF MEDINA COUNTY WHERE THERE IS NO RULE OF LAW) IS GUIDED BY CERTAIN DOCTRINES AND RULES OF PRACTICE INTENDED TO PROMOTED THE
ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
HERE IS WHERE WE ENCOUNTER THE FIRST HICCUP WHERE
DELIBERATE INJUSTICE PREVAILS IN THE KANGAROO COURTS OF MEDINA COUNTY, ALL IN THE SELF-INTEREST OF THE MOVERS AND SHAKERS OF THE
MEDINA COUNTY REPUBLICRAT PARTY WHO HAVE BENEFITED FINANCIALLY FROM THEIR HOLD ON POWER. THE
KEYSTONE PIPELINE IS A PERFECT CASE DIRECTLY ON POINT WHERE
CERTAIN LOCAL POLITICIANS HAVE REAPED SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL REWARDS CONTRA THE BEST INTERESTS OF RESIDENTS.
HERE IN MEDINA COUNTY GOVERNMENT, MONEY TALKS AND BULLSHIT WALKS. NO DOUBT! AMERICAN POET AND SONGWRITER BOB DYLAN IS QUOTED, "MONEY DOESN'T TALK, IT SWEARS!
TURNING TO THE
MANIFEST INJUSTICE FOUND DAILY IN THE MEDINA COUNTY "JUSTUS" SYSTEM, IT IS CERTAINLY APPROPRIATE TO COMPARE THE MISCONDUCT OF THAT
WORTHLESS F@CK "JUDGE WEASELPECKER COLLIER" WITH THE DEMANDS OF THE LAW (OUTSIDE MEDINA COUNTY).
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (OUTSIDE MEDINA COUNTY) IS COMPELLED TO ABIDE THE
DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS, WHICH, IN LAYMAN'S TERMS,
REQUIRES A JUDGE TO FOLLOW AND RULE IN ACCORD WITH PRIOR LEGAL DECISIONS, PARTICULARLY DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
IT WOULD APPEAR THAT WORTHLESS F@CK COLLIER BELIEVES THAT "STARE DECISIS" IS THE NAME OF THE NEW ROLLER COASTER AT CEDAR POINT!
THE BLOGGER NOW POINTS TO THE CASE OF THE INNOCENT MAN RAILROADED BY F@@KWAD COLLIER AND PROFILED AT THIS BLOG.
AS AN INITIAL MATTER, MEDINA COUNTY ASS PROSECUTOR (AND FORREST THOMPSON'S CHIEF (F@CKUP) OF THE CRIMINAL DIVISION SCOTT SLEAZEBURY, FAILED TO CITE TO ANY LEGAL AUTHORITY AT TRIAL.
THE BEST THAT SLEAZEBURY COULD DO AT TRIAL IS TO CLAIM, "THERE ARE CASES OUT THERE SOMEWHERE." THAT NEBULOUS CITATION TO "LEGAL AUTHORITY: WAS GOOD ENOUGH FOR THAT WORTHLESS F@CK COLLIER!
THIS, OF COURSE, IS NOTHING MORE THAN A PATTERN OF CONDUCT IN "WEASELPECKER'S" KANGAROO COURTROOM #1.
PERHAPS A DIGRESSION TO A DECISION FROM THE OHIO NINTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS IN State v. Johnson, Ninth Dist. Medina No. 09CA0054, 2011-Ohio-3623.
The prosecutor’s [Scott Sleazebury] “cross-examination” of these women was improper, and the trial court [Judge Collier] should not have allowed him to get away with it. [Emphasis added.] Id.,at ¶ 49.
[W]e note a suggestion from the Eighth District that, “[i]f we are to stop short of punishing the State for a prosecutor’s misbehavior by refusing to overturn otherwise valid convictions, perhaps such cases should routinely be referred to disciplinary counsel so that individual prosecutors can be impressed with the need for ethical behavior.” State v. Cody, 8th Dist. No. 77427, 2002-Ohio-7055, at ¶38.”Id., at ¶ 70.
THE COURT OF APPEALS NOT ONLY RECOGNIZED SLEAZEBURY'S USUAL AND CUSTOMARY MISCONDUCT BUT POLITELY EXCORIATED "WEASELPECKER" COLLIER FOR BEING THE WORTHLESS F@CK THAT HE IS IS, EVEN ON HIS BEST DAY.
LET'S LOOK AT THE CONTROLLING LEGAL AUTHORITIES THE DEFENDANT PRESENTED IN HIS BRIEFS BUT TO WHICH F@@KWAD COLLIER TURNED A BLIND EYE AT TRIAL, SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF RAILROADING AN INNOCENT CITIZEN, ONE MORE INSTITUTIONAL CRIME BY COLLIER.
FOLLOWING ARE SOME, BUT NOT ALL, THE CONTROLLING CASES F@@KWAD COLLIER IGNORED, VIOLATING THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS:
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)
- “Constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. *** It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.”
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-406 (1965)
- The right of cross-examination, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial.
Mapp v. Ohio,367 U.S. 643 (1961)
- Evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not admissible at trial.
Payton v. New York,445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)
- “When police conduct a warrantless search, the state bears the burden of establishing the validity of the search.”
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.14 (1967)
- Sixth Amendment right of a defendant to compulsory process extends to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-62 (2004)
- “The Confrontation Clause commands, not that the evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-318 (1974)
-Denial of the “right of effective cross-examination” is “constitutional error of the first magnitude” requiring automatic reversal.
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895)
- It is the duty of the court (not the prosecutor) to expound the law, and the jury to apply the facts to the law, otherwise the stability of justice and personal rights are jeopardized.
Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005)
- “It is…elementary law, federal and state, that the judge bears ultimate responsibility for instructing a lay jury in the law.”
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
- State’s obligation to disclose information and evidence favorable to the defendant.
United States v. Agurs,427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)
- “… the Court has consistently held that a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, [Footnote 8] and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.”
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, Fn 7 (1976), citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
- Due process of law “cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a state to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is an inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation.”
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, Fn 8 (1985)
- “…the Brady rule has its roots in a series of cases dealing with convictions based on the prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony. In Mooney v. Holohan, (1935), the Court established the rule that the knowing use by a state prosecutor of perjured testimony to obtain a conviction and the deliberate suppression of evidence that would have impeached and refuted the testimony constitutes a denial of due process.”
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 307 (1966)]
- Government invasion of the defense camp compels conviction to be set aside as constitutionally defective.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241 (1983)
- Probable cause, to be determined on the totality of the circumstances, requires corroboration of a tip by independent police work/investigation.
Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971)
- Criminal complaint not setting out a statement of essential facts does not pass constitutional muster.
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724 (1969)
- There is no exception to the rule that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible at trial.
Gray v. Mississippi,481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987)
- “We have recognized that "some constitutional rights [are] so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S., at 23. The right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge or jury, is such a right.”
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 172-173 (1997)
- “As to a criminal defendant, Rule 403's term "unfair prejudice" speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on an improper basis rather than on proof specific to the offense charged.Such improper grounds certainly include generalizing from a past bad act that a defendant is by propensity the probable perpetrator of the current crime. Thus, Rule 403 requires that the relative probative value of prior-conviction evidence be balanced against its prejudicial risk of misuse. A judge should balance these factors not only for the item in question but also for any actually available substitutes. If an alternative were found to have substantially the same or greater probative value but a lower danger of unfair prejudice, sound judicial discretion would discount the value of the item first offered and exclude it if its discounted probative value were substantially outweighed by unfairly prejudicial risk.Pp. 180-185.”
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, at 14 (2006)
- “Through the in limine procedure, the (courts) should redact or exclude the portions of any statement that have become testimonial, as they do, for example, with unduly prejudicial portions of otherwise admissible evidence.”
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)
- Individual cannot be compelledto testify against a spouse.
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, at syllabus ¶ 2
- “Criminal defendants have the right under the Compulsory Process Clause to the government’s assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial, and the right to put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt.”
Holloway v. Florida, 449 U.S. 905, 907 (1980)
- “Thus the Court more than once has expressed the understanding that a lesser-included-offense (instruction) minimizes the risk of undermining the reasonable-doubt standard.”
Sansone v. United States, 330 U.S. 343, 349 (1965)
- “In a case where some elements of the crime charged themselves constitute a lesser crime, if the evidence justified it, would no doubt be entitled to an instruction which would permit a finding of guilt of the lesser offense.”
State v. Morris, 2007-Ohio-3591, at ¶ 37
- In the prosecution for alleged violations of 2911.11 ORC, “due process requires that the particularized nature of the accused’s conduct includes the behavior that demonstrates he committed an underlying offense.”
State v. Hous,2004-Ohio-666, at ¶ 11
- “…jury instructions given at the end of a trial cannot relate back to give an accused adequate notice of the charges against which an accused must defend….”
State v. Hubbard, 2004-Ohio-5204, at ¶ 6
- “Under Evid.R. 602, a witness may testify only to those matters of which he has personal knowledge…gained through firsthand observation or experience and actually perceived the subject matter of his testimony.”
State v. Taylor,(1993) 66 Ohio St. 3d 295, 300-301
- “For a purported excited utterance to be admissible there must have been: …(4) the declarant must have personally observed the event.”
Cox v. Oliver Machinery Co., (1987) 41 Ohio App. 3d 28, at 35-36
- “The key to the statement’s trustworthiness is the spontaneity of the statement, either contemporaneous with the event or immediately thereafter.”
State v. Mitchell, 2007-Ohio-1696, at ¶ 19
- “The Ohio Supreme Court has recently affirmed that recordings of 911 calls that werewhen the declarantis not available to testify at trial.”
State v. Henness (1997), 79 Ohio St. 3d 53, ¶ 1 of the syllabus
- “…the testifying spouse remains incompetent *** until she makes a deliberate choice to testify, with knowledge of her right to refuse. The trial court must take an active role in determining competency, and must make an affirmative determination on the record that the spouse has electedto testify.”
State v. Hunt(1994), 97 Ohio App. 3d 372,
- holding that a cross-examiner may not make testimonial assertions under the pretext of asking a question.
WHILE THE BLOGGER CONTENDS THAT
THESE FACTS ALONE ARE SUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE THAT
"WEASELPECKER" COLLIER IS A CROOK,
IN THE SPIRIT ON MAGNANIMITY, THE
BLOGGER IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE
ALTERNATIVE THEORY THAT THIS
F@CKING MORON JUST CANT READ!!!
YET THE MOVERS AND SHAKERS OF
MEDINA'S REPUBLICRAT PARTY JUST LOVE
THIS CORRUPT DOUCHEBAG! IS THERE
ANY WONDER?
