STA-PUF KERN PROVES TO BE ANOTHER ROADS SCHOLAR !!!

The blogger points once again to the recent brief filed by STA-PUF KERN, which decidedly points to the fact that STA-PUF KERN is just one more Medina County ROADS SCHOLAR ( not to be confused with "Rhodes Scholar") and has joined the ranks of other ROADS SCHOLARS LIKE LAPDOG COLLIER, THE VILLAGE IDIOT AND TOWN WHORE, AS WELL AS CORRUPT MEDINA COUNTY PROSECUTOR DINO HOEMAN AND HIS MINIONS SCOTT SLEAZEBURY AND MISTAFA RAZAVI !!!

For the benefit of the readers, a ROADS SCHOLAR is defined as a geographically challenged individual who must study a ROAD MAP in order to travel from the Medina County Courthouse, Railroad Station & Mosque, located at the Medina Square, to Interstate 71.

It is time, once again, to examine STA-PUF'S brief in order to assess his intellectual capacities.

In STA-PUF'S brief, at Page 19, makes the following moronic claim:

"[Defendant's] reliance on Gerstein v Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), is likewise misplaced because Gerstein only holds that an accused is entitled to a determination of probable cause after arrest.  [Defendant] received that [Defendant] received that determination when he appeared for a first appearance in Wadsworth Municipal Court.  Judge McIlvaine (ANOTHER LEGAL ROCKET SCIENTIST) set bond with conditions AND CONTINUED THE PRELIMINARY HEARING."
 

 WOW! STA-PUF WORKS IN THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE AND DOES NOT KNOW THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN INITIAL APPEARANCE AND A PRELIMINARY HEARING ? A TRULY MIND-NUMBING DISCLOSURE!!!

Apparently, STA-PUF was back in the Men's washroom, again, during law school class on Criminal Procedure.

So as to not confuse STA-PUF with all of those complicated legal terms found in all of those STUFFY OLD LAW BOOKS, the blogger will refer to the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, with which STA-PUF does not seem to be particularly familiar, to define and differentiate between "Initial Appearance" and "Preliminary Hearing."

RULE 5. Initial Appearance, Preliminary Hearing





(A) Procedure upon initial appearance.

When a defendant first appears before ajudge or magistrate,the judge or magistrate shall permit the accused or his counsel to read thecomplaint or a copy thereof, and shall inform the defendant:  

(1) Of the nature of the charge against him;                     

(2) That he has a right to counsel and the right to a reasonable continuance in the proceedings to secure counsel, and, pursuant to Crim. R. 44,the right to have counsel assigned without cost to himself if he is unable to employ counsel;

(3) That he need make no statement and any statement made may be used against him;

(4) Of his right to a preliminary hearing in a felony case, when his initial appearance is not pursuant to indictment;

(5) Of his right, where appropriate, to jury trial and the necessity to make demand therefor in petty offense cases.

In addition, if the defendant has not been admitted to bail for a bailable offense, the judge or magistrate shall admit the defendant to bail as provided in these rules.

In felony cases the defendant shall not be called upon to plead either at the initial appearance or at a preliminary hearing.
 In misdemeanor cases the defendant may be called upon to plead at the initial appearance.

Where the defendant enters a plea the procedure established by Crim. R. 10 and Crim. R. 11 applies.

AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE PRIMARY INTENDED PURPOSE OF THE INITIAL APPEARANCE IS TO SET BAIL.
 

 (B) Preliminary hearing in felony cases; procedure.

(1) In felony cases a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing unless waived in writing.[T]he judge or magistrate shall schedule a preliminary hearing within a reasonable time, but in any event no later than ten consecutive days following arrest or service of summons if the defendant is in custody.

(4) Upon conclusion of all the evidence and the statement, if any, of the accused, the court shall do one of the following:

 

(a) Find that there is probable cause to believe the crime alleged or another felony has been committed and that the defendant committed it, and bind the defendant over to the court of common pleas of the county or any other county in which venue appears.

 

(c) Order the accused discharged.
 

 SO, THE OHIO RULES PROVIDE THAT, AT THE INITIAL APPEARANCE, THE JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE IS REQUIRED TO SCHEDULE A PRELIMINARY HEARING WITHIN TEN DAYS.

SO THEN, AND THIS IS APPARENTLY DIFFICULT FOR STA-PUF TO COMPREHEND, IN THE PROGRESSION OF ANY CASE THE PRELIMINARY HEARING FOLLOWS THE INITIAL APPEARANCE BY TEN DAYS.

AT THE INITIAL APPEARANCE, THE COURT SETS BAIL.

AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING, THE COURT IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT AN ARREST.

The blogger has tried to explain and differentiate these two separate stages of a proceeding that in the most basic terms, so as not to cause undue confusion for STA-PUF.

By STA-PUF'S own admission, Judge MvIlaine, " CONTINUED THE PRELIMINARY HEARING."  STA-PUF apparently failed to understand the highly technical term "CONTINUED THE PRELIMINARY HEARING."  What it means, in layman's terms, is that McIlvaine SCHEDULED THE PRELIMINARY HEARING AT A FUTURE DATE.

IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE JUDGE "CONTINUED" TO HEAR TESTIMONY AT THE INITIAL APPEARANCE, AS STA-PUF KERN APPARENTLY BELIEVES.

CONTRARY TO STA-PUF'S MISTAKEN BELIEF, AS HE CLAIMS IN HIS BRIEF, THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ACCORDED HIS RIGHT TO A PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION AT HIS INITIAL APPEARANCE, WHEN McILVAINE SIMPLY SET BAIL AND BY STA-PUF'S OWN ADMISSION, "CONTINUED"  (SET FOR A FUTURE DATE) A PRELIMINARY HEARING.

NOW THE READER KNOWS WHY STA-PUF KERN MERITS THE TITLE OF MEDINA COUNTY "ROADS SCHOLAR."