"WHAT DO YOU MEAN I HAVE TO WRITE OUT WHAT HAPPENED? WE NEVER DO THAT!"

        The criminal complaint in this case, filed by Deputy Clinage with the Wadsworth Municipal Court, did not contain a statement of essential facts, was not sworn by Deputy Clinage, and was not reviewed for a finding of probable cause by a neutral and detached judicial officer, RENDERING THE ARREST WARRANT CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFECTIVE AND IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION!

               

         Following Defendant's arrest, the defense investigator went to the office of the Clerk of the Wadsworth Municipal Court and obtained copies of the criminal complaint and warrant filed by Medina County Sheriff’s Deputy Douglas Clinage in support of Defendant's arrest. An examination of the criminal complaint disclosed that it failed to contain a statement of essential facts that might be reviewed and considered by a neutral and detached judicial officer for a finding of probable cause, as required by Ohio Crim.R. 3.

           Pictured below is a copy of the CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFECTIVE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT filed by Deputy Clinage.  You will note that the defective criminal complaint fails to set out any information from which a neutral and detached judicial officer might find probable cause, that is if "judge" McIlvaine ever bothered to take the time to review a criminal complaint for probable cause, AS REQUIRED BY THE LAW. He's probably just been too busy preparing his lesson plans, planning to instruct newby judges how to do it ... the wrong way!

         

         




         Finding that there was no statement of essential facts set out upon the face of the criminal complaint, the defense investigator requested a copy of the affidavit which he expected would have been offered in support of the criminal complaint. A complete review of the court’s file disclosed that there was no supporting affidavit. In fact, the deputy clerks at the Office of the Clerk of the Wadsworth Municipal Court had absolutely no concept or awareness of any affidavit filed by any officer, at any time, offered in support of any criminal complaint ever filed in the Wadsworth Municipal Court.  Essentially, all the criminal complaints filed in the Wadsworth Municipal Court failed to set out the essential facts upon which probable cause might otherwise be determined by a neutral and detached judicial officer.


        In sum, each and every criminal complaint, and the each and every arrest arrest warrant flowing from such defective criminal complaints, are and have been CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFECTIVE!

           Inquiring further of the deputy clerks, the defense investigator learned that it is the usual and customary practice of the Clerk of the Court to issue arrest warrants, based upon such defective criminal complaints, without any review whatsoever by the judge or magistrate of the court. The first time that the judge of the Wadsworth Municipal Court encounters these defective complaints and warrants is at a defendant’s initial appearance.

         Failure of an officer to set out a statement of essential facts in a criminal complaint constitutes a violation of Ohio Crim. R. 3, and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides in pertinent part “…no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.”

OF COURSE, IN MEDINA COUNTY, COLLIER FEELS NO OBLIGATION TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION OR THE OHIO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE! AFTER ALL, BEING ASSURED OF A LIFETIME UNCONTESTED SEAT ON THE MEDINA COUNTY BENCH, COMPLIMENTS OF CORRUPT MEDINA COUNTY PROSECUTOR DINO HOLMAN, WHY WOULD HE BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE STATE OF THE LAW OUTSIDE MEDINA COUNTY?

MUCH MORE TO COME ....

"FORGET PROBABLE CAUSE, LET'S JUST ARREST HIM. WE CAN SORT IT OUT LATER!"

     After ignoring all the obvious signs that there was no obvious criminal activity after an observation of nearly one full hour, these unskilled and unschooled sheriff’s deputies rushed headlong into the situation, without thinking, without determining whether they had probable cause, and arrested Defendant without probable cause.  The deputies seized the unloaded .22 caliber target pistol from Defendant.

         At the suppression hearing, Deputies Frank Telatko and Douglas Clinage were the only two sheriff’s deputies to offer testimony.

         When questioned on cross-examination as to reasons for making the arrest, Deputy Telatko, the arresting officer, testified, “we had a call” and “he (Defendant) had a gun.” When questioned further, Telatko testified, “WE TOOK HIM INTO CUSTODY UNTIL WE COULD SORT IT ALL OUT."


          It is noted that the proper law of the land, outside Medina County, does not provide for an officer making an arrest with the intent of "sorting it out later."  It has to be reasonably "sorted out" by an officer prior to making an arrest, AS A MATTER OF LAW!

         Deputy Clinage, the lead investigator to whom the case was assigned by the Medina County Sheriff’s Office, did not arrive on the scene until after the time that Defendant had been arrested. When questioned during the suppression hearing, on cross-examination, as to the probable cause for the arrest, Clinage testified, in part, that the evening of May 27, 2009 had been a “complicated night” because “the charge kept changing.”

Neither Telatko nor Clinage, the State’s only two witnesses, were able to testify as to the essential facts that led to Defendant’s arrest, as the record will show!


It is therefore understandable why Clinage failed to set out the essential facts in his defective criminal complaint.  He was simply unable to do so, since there were no facts to set out by which he could establish probable cause for an arrest.

         It is elemental that a police officer must satisfy himself that a suspect has probably violated all of the elements of a specific offense in order to establish probable cause upon which to base an arrest.  It is clear from the testimony given at the suppression hearing that none of the officers had accomplished this requisite mental exercise prior to taking Defendant into custody.  Probable cause cannot be formed in an officer’s mind in hindsight ... EXCEPT IN MEDINA COUNTY AND BEFORE COLLIER!

         Possession of an unconcealed firearm, most particularly in the rural area of the scene, that is adjacent to a shooting range as is the Flintstone residence, is not a criminal offense. The information relayed to the dispatcher and originating from Wilma Flintstone, as deputies contemporaneously surveyed the scene and observed Defendant and Mr. Flintstone talking peacefully in the driveway for nearly one full hour, was not only uncorroborated but was actually refuted by the deputies’ personal observations.

         These sheriff’s deputies are obviously poorly trained, do not comprehend the most basic laws of arrest, search and seizure, probable cause, and have demonstrated extremely poor judgment as a result.

         In the defense Motion to Suppress, defense counsel drew the COLLIER’s attention to Illinois v Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) and allied cases, holding that a “tip” requires corroboration by law enforcement officers before probable cause can be reasonably established.

         It is clear from the testimony adduced at the suppression hearing that the deputies arrested Defendant without probable cause. Therefore, the physical evidence seized from the Defendant incident to the unlawful arrest should have been suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree, as held by the United States Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio.

In 1961, more than 50 years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), holding "that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, which protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures," may not be used in criminal prosecutions in state courts, as well as federal courts."

For a snapshot of Mapp v. Ohio, you can follow this link: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mapp_v._Ohio

 Nevertheless, CORRUPT MEDINA COUNTY JUDGE COLLIER accepted the tainted evidence as properly admitted at trial, contrary to the prevailing case law and all to the intended benefit of the prosecutor.  COLLIER didn't want to displease HOLMAN by ruling in accord with the LAW OF THE LAND!  

PERHAPS COLLIER BELIEVED THE SUPREME COURT WAS IN ERROR IN DECIDING THE LAW OF THE LAND!  AFTER ALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES HOLD LIFETIME APPOINTMENTS, JUST LIKE COLLIER HAS A LIFETIME UNCONTESTED APPOINTMENT TO THE MEDINA COUNTY BENCH COMPLIMENTS OF CORRUPT MEDINA COUNTY PROSECUTOR DINO HOLMAN!

MUCH MORE TO COME ....

ANOTHER SNAPPY RETORT FROM SALISBURY!

I find it more than interesting that assistant prosecutor SCOTT SALISBURY a/k/a SLEAZEBURY (for obvious reasons) has chosen the email address of CORRUPTGOV216@AOL.COM to send more of his "anonymous" comments to this blog, which has certainly taken all of the courage he could muster.


There is no little irony here, although, to be precise, SALISBURY should have used the correct area code: 330.


HERE'S THE LATEST SNAPPY RETORT FROM SALISBURY:

It is apparent you have gone completely mad! Sounds like Barney is a scumbag hillbilly who deserves what he got and you are just trying to spin the facts in a matter that would be beneficial to Barney. Your blog sucks, you suck, go to hell.

By corruptgov216 on "WE GOTTA ARREST HIM FOR SOMETHING, BUT I'M NOT SU... at 9:02 AM

There are really a few interesting features about SALISBURY's latest "anonymous" comment.

First of all, you will take note of the fact that SALISBURY's "anonymous" comment was sent to the blog at 9:02 am on January 27, 2011, well within his scheduled "work hours."  Once again, SALISBURY appears to be engaging in his little diatribe on the taxpayers' dime, unless he has been SUSPENDED FOR HIS UNSEEMLY CONDUCT, WHICH IS CLEARLY UNBECOMING A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE.

That prospect seems unlikely, however, since SALISBURY is a chip off of HOLMAN's block.

Next, he refers to "Barney" as a "hillbilly."  You may wish to consider there are no references to "Barney" at the blog, and certainly no use of the term "hillbilly."

Perhaps, SALISBURY refers to the Defendant, whom he and COLLIER knowingly and willfully deprived of a fair trial, as the facts and the evidence will clearly show, as this account unfolds at this blog.

Lastly, SALISBURY speaks of "spinning the facts," which I find more than amusing.  The deputy who "investigated" this case expended a total of 36 minutes doing so and wote a report that is hardly comprehensive.  


Of course, since there was NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION, SALISBURY, WITH THE FULL APPROVAL OF COLLIER, HAD TO REACH DEEPLY INTO HIS BAG OF TRICKS AND MANUFACTURED A LITTLE "EVIDENCE" OF HIS OWN, INTRODUCE PERJURED TESTIMONY FROM A "WITNESS" WHO OBSERVED NOTHING, AND WITHHELD FAVORABLE, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE FROM THE DEFENDANT.


SALISBURY is simply unaccustomed to honestly dealing with the facts and the truth ... it's against HOLMAN's office policy.

THOSE ARE THE FACTS, MUCH TO SALISBURY's DISMAY, THAT WILL BE PRESENTED HERE!

MUCH MORE TO COME .....

"WE GOTTA ARREST HIM FOR SOMETHING, BUT I'M NOT SURE FOR WHAT!"

        Sheriff’s deputies, a total of eight in number, responded to the Flintstone residence, the first deputy arriving at 6:22 pm. Sheriff’s deputies established a perimeter and maintained surveillance of Defendant and Fred Flintstone, standing and talking in the driveway of the Flintstone residence, until about 7:00 pm when they arrested Defendant. 

        According to the sworn testimony of the deputies at the suppression hearing, they did not observe Defendant engage in any violent or criminal activity during that period of observation, nor did they observe Defendant enter or exit the Flintstone residence.

         So, while Wilma Flintstone was relating unfounded and unobserved information to the 911 dispatcher, including Mrs. Flintstone's claim that she heard “death rattles” coming from somewhere within her house, the deputies were simultaneously observing Defendant and Mr. Flintstone all the while talking peacefully in the driveway of the Flintstone residence.

         Any thinking, reasonably trained and prudent law enforcement officer should have immediately recognized that the information being reported by the dispatcher to them, via radio, did not jibe with their personal observations. 

         These circumstances alone should have required the deputies to stop, take stock of the situation, and conclude that additional inquiry and investigation was warranted to determine the facts before making an arrest.  After all, this isn't exactly ROCKET SCIENCE!

This fact alone is more than sufficient proof that common sense is not so common, particularly at the Medina County Sheriff's Office.  It's a bit frightening to think that these deputies are entrusted with loaded firearms.  

     In 1983, The United States Supreme Court decided the case of Illinois v. Gates, and held:

     " Our decisions applying the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis outlined above have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work. In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 269, we held that an affidavit relying on hearsay "is not to be deemed insufficient on that score so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented." We went on to say that, even in making a warrantless arrest, an officer" may rely upon information received through an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long as the informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer's knowledge."

Ibid. Likewise, we recognized the probative value of corroborative efforts of police officials in Aguilar -- the source of the "two-pronged test" -- by observing that, if the police had made some effort to corroborate the informant's report at issue, "an entirely different case" would have been presented. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 109, n. 1.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241-242 (1983)

A brief explanation of the facts and holdings in Illinois v. Gates cna be found at this link:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illinois_v._Gates

     In 1964, more than 40 years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Beck v. Ohio.

     In part, the Supreme Court held:

"Whether (an) arrest (is) constitutionally valid depends, in turn, upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it -- whether, at that moment, the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 338 U. S. 175-176; Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 361 U. S. 102."

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)

A basic explanation of the holding of the United States Supreme Court in the matter of Beck v Ohio can be found at this link: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beck_v._Ohio

In the case of this Defendant, the deputies not only failed to corroborate the reports of Wilma Flintstone coming from within the Flintstone home, but their actual observations at the scene refuted the ongoing telephone reports coming from Wilma, as they watched the Defendant and Fred Flintstone talking peacefully in the driveway of the Flintstone residence for nearly one full hour.


THESE UNSKILLED AND UNSCHOOLED DEPUTIES LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE DEFENDANT COMMITTED A CRIMINAL OFFENSE AT THE MOMENT OF ARREST, AND THEREAFTER!

IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT THESE DEPUTIES DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE MOST BASIC LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE.

BUT THEN AGAIN, NEITHER DOES COLLIER, WHO UPHELD THE UNLAWFUL ARREST, MADE BY DEPUTIES WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE.

COLLIER, WHO IS OBVIOUSLY NOT A DEEP THINKER, WAS MADE AWARE OF THE LAW BY DEFENSE COUNSEL, BUT RULED IN FAVOR OF SALISBURY SOLELY TO PRESERVE HIS UNCONTESTED LIFETIME APPOINTMENT TO THE MEDINA COUNTY COURT, COMPLIMENTS OF CORRUPT DEM PROSECUTOR DINO HOLMAN.

MUCH MORE TO COME ....

THE NON-INCIDENT LEADING TO PRISON IN THE CORRUPT COURTS OF MEDINA COUNTY

It's time to set the stage and recount events leading to the unlawful arrest and conviction of an innocent man in the Medina County Court of Common Pleas before TOTALLY CORRUPT JUDGE CHRISTOPHER COLLIER.


Following a visit at the Medina General Hospital, the Defendant, his wife, and three small children went to dinner at a Medina Restaurant.  During the meal, Defendant told his wife that he intended to visit his friend, Fred Flintstone, to display his newly purchased ATV and to do some shooting.  Thereafter, Defendant and his wife argued and left the restaurant at approximately 5:30 pm.

Defendant drove 15 minutes to his parents' home in rural Medina County, relinquished the car keys to his wife who drove off, still angry from the argument.  For the next 20 minutes, defendant watered the parents' vegetable garden.

At 6:03 pm, Defendant placed a telephone call to his wife's cell phone. The call went to voice mail. Thereafter, Defendant obtained his .22 caliber western-style single-action revolver, which was holstered in a western-style gun belt.  Defendant drove his ATV approximately one mile to the Flintstone residence, as planned.

As Defendant passed the trees obscuring vision of the Flintstone driveway and home, he discovered that his wife had driven to the Flintstone residence.  Defendant errantly believed that his wife, who had foreknowledge that he was going to the Flintstones' home, had preceded him there in order to make amends for their earlier argument.

The photo below was taken from the front of the home of Defendant's parents, looking down the road toward the Flintstone residence, one mile away, which cannot be seen from the parents' home!

Unbeknownst to Defendant, the wife, who had been suffering from postpartum depression had gone to the Flintstone residence and caused a scene.

Defendant dismounted his ATV, with the gun belt still slung over his neck and shoulder, and called out to his friend, Fred. After calling out several times, he entered the breezeway of the Flintstone residence through an open door, as he'd done many times before.


As he entered the home, Defendant called out to his wife, "Babe," a term of endearment.  At this time, Defendant was met by Fred at gunpoint, who demanded Defendant turn over his holstered target gun.
Defendant immediately turned over the holstered firearm and questioned Fred about his greeting.

Defendant and Fred then went out into the driveway and engaged in a period of friendly conversation for nearly one full hour, during which time Defendant offered to give $2,000.00, the last of his savings, to Fred who was facing potential foreclosure of his home and acreage.

In the meanwhile, Wilma, Fred's wife, had called 911 and, for nearly one full hour, related all manner of imagined violent events which she thought may have been occurring, even though she was seated on a bedroom floor and could neither see nor hear events outside of the bedroom.


Medina County Sheriff's deputies responded and established a perimeter, watching Defendant and Fred talking peacefully for nearly one full hour as Wilma Flintstone continually informed the dispatcher of events she could neither see nor hear, including the claim that she heard "death rattles" coming from her living room.


Sheriff's deputies, who have nothing on the Keystone Cops, rushed Defendant and Fred, and threw both to the ground as Defendant had mounted his ATV and prepared to return to his parents' home.  Defendant was placed under arrest and charged with a plethora of criminal offenses, despite the fact that the Keystone deputies had no probable cause to arrest him, since no crime had been committed.  At the time of arrest, the Keystone deputies recovered the UNLOADED .22 CALIBER TARGET GUN FROM THE DEFENDANT.


The stage is now set.  Following I will disclose the many and varied techniques, unlawful and unethical, used by CORRUPT COUNTY PROSECUTORS and TOTALLY CORRUPT MEDINA COUNTY JUDGE CHRISTOPHER COLLIER to convict an innocent man and send him to prison for 5 years.


AS THIS ACCOUNT UNFOLDS, YOU WILL PLAINLY SEE WHY WE NEED AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OF THE MEDINA COUNTY COURTS BY THE CRIMINAL DIVISION OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE!


MUCH MORE TO COME ....

"LAW? WE DON'T NEED NO STINKIN' LAW!" SAYS CORRUPT MEDINA COUNTY JUDGE CHRISTOPHER COLLIER!

Presented below are some (but not all) of the holdings of appellate courts, including the UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, that TOTALLY CORRUPT JUDGE CHRISTOPHER COLLIER SIMPLY IGNORED AT TRIAL, EVEN THOUGHT PROVIDED WITH THESE VERY CASES IN PLEADINGS BY DEFENSE COUNSEL.


As usual, Salisbury wrote no briefs in opposition, and never once cited a controlling case authority during this purported trial, COMPELLING EVIDENCE THAT HOLMAN OWNS COLLIER AND CAN RELY ON COLLIER TO DO HIS BIDDING, WELL OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LAW. 


I suspect that COLLIER was watching TV re-runs of Judge Judy, rather than reading the briefs of defense counsel which advanced the controlling law.  But then again, COLLIER doesn't need to read NO STINKIN' LAW!

Collier’s rulings ignored and contravened the prevailing law, including precedents and holdings of the United States Supreme Court, despite having been fully briefed on the law by defense counsel. 

The prosecutor cited no law during these proceedings. Following are some, but not all, of the cases that Collier, despite having been fully briefed on them, simply ignored in “fixing” this case for the county prosecutor:

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)

         - “Constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. *** It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.”

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-406 (1965)

         - The right of cross-examination, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)

         - Evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not admissible at trial

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)

         - “When police conduct a warrantless search, the state bears the burden of establishing the validity of the search.”

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.14 (1967)

         - Sixth Amendment right of a defendant to compulsory process extends to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-62 (2004)

         -  “The Confrontation Clause commands, not that the evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-318 (1974)

         - Denial of the “right of effective cross-examination” is “constitutional error of the first magnitude” requiring automatic reversal

Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895)

         - It is the duty of the court (not the prosecutor) to expound the law, and the jury to apply the facts to the law, otherwise the stability of justice and personal rights are jeopardized

Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005)

         - “It is…elementary law, federal and state, that the judge bears ultimate responsibility for instructing a lay jury in the law.”

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)

         - State’s obligation to disclose information and evidence favorable to the defendant

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)

         - “… the Court has consistently held that a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair,[Footnote 8] and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.”

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, Fn 7 (1976), citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103

         - Due process of law “cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a state to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is an inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation.”

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, Fn 8 (1985)

         - “…the Brady rule has its roots in a series of cases dealing with convictions based on the prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony. In Mooney v. Holohan, (1935), the Court established the rule that the knowing use by a state prosecutor of perjured testimony to obtain a conviction and the deliberate suppression of evidence that would have impeached and refuted the testimony constitutes a denial of due process.”

Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 307 (1966)]

         - Government invasion of the defense camp compels conviction to be set aside as constitutionally defective

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241 (1983)

         - Probable cause, to be determined on the totality of the circumstances, requires corroboration of a tip by independent police work/investigation

Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971)

         - Criminal complaint not setting out a statement of essential facts does not pass constitutional muster

Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724 (1969)

         - There is no exception to the rule that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible at trial

Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987)

         - “We have recognized that "some constitutional rights [are] so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless  error." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S., at 23. The right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge or jury, is such a right.”

Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 172-173 (1997)

         - “As to a criminal defendant, Rule 403's term "unfair prejudice" speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on an improper basis rather than on proof specific to the offense charged. Such improper grounds certainly include generalizing from a past bad act that a defendant is by propensity the probable perpetrator of the current crime. Thus, Rule 403 requires that the relative probative value of prior-conviction evidence be balanced against its prejudicial risk of misuse. A judge  should balance these factors not only for the item in question but also for any actually available substitutes. If an alternative were found to have substantially the same or greater probative value but a lower danger of unfair prejudice, sound judicial discretion would discount the value of the item first offered and exclude it if its discounted probative value were substantially outweighed by unfairly prejudicial risk. Pp. 180-185.”

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, at 14 (2006)

         - “Through the in limine procedure, the (courts) should redact or exclude the portions of any statement that have become testimonial, as they do, for example, with unduly prejudicial portions of otherwise admissible evidence.”

Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)

         - Individual cannot be compelled to testify against a spouse

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, at syllabus ¶ 2

         - “Criminal defendants have the right under the Compulsory Process Clause to the government’s assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial, and the right to put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt.”

Holloway v. Florida, 449 U.S. 905, 907 (1980)

         - “Thus the Court more than once has expressed the understanding

that a lesser-included-offense (instruction) minimizes the risk of undermining the reasonable-doubt standard.”

Sansone v. United States, 330 U.S. 343, 349 (1965)

         - “In a case where some elements of the crime charged themselves constitute a lesser crime, if the evidence justified it, would no doubt be entitled to an instruction which would permit a finding of guilt of the lesser offense.”

State v. Morris, 2007-Ohio-3591, at ¶ 37

         - In the prosecution for alleged violations of 2911.11 ORC, “due process requires that the particularized nature of the accused’s conduct includes the behavior that demonstrates he committed an underlying offense.”

State v. Hous, 2004-Ohio-666, at ¶ 11

         -  “…jury instructions given at the end of a trial cannot relate back to give an accused adequate notice of the charges against which an accused must defend….”

State v. Hubbard, 2004-Ohio-5204, at ¶ 6

         - “Under Evid.R. 602, a witness may testify only to those matters of which he has personal knowledge…gained through firsthand observation or experience and actually perceived the subject matter of his testimony.”

State v. Taylor, (1993) 66 Ohio St. 3d 295, 300-301

         - “For a purported excited utterance to be admissible there must 

have been: …(4) the declarant must have personally observed the event.”

Cox v. Oliver Machinery Co., (1987) 41 Ohio App. 3d 28, at 35-36

         - “The key to the statement’s trustworthiness is the spontaneity of

the statement, either contemporaneous with the event or immediately          thereafter.”

State v. Mitchell, 2007-Ohio-1696, at ¶ 19

         - “The Ohio Supreme Court has recently affirmed that recordings of 911 calls that were made to avoid immediate danger are not testimonial and do not violate the Confrontation Clause when the declarant is not available to testify at trial.”

State v. Henness (1997), 79 Ohio St. 3d 53, ¶ 1 of the syllabus

         - “…the testifying spouse remains incompetent *** until she makes a deliberate choice to testify, with knowledge of her right to refuse. The trial court must take an active role in determining competency, and must make an affirmative determination on the record that the spouse has elected to testify.”

State v. Hunt (1994), 97 Ohio App. 3d 372, holding that a cross-examiner may not make testimonial assertions under the pretext of asking a question

You will note that I have cited 32 appellate cases above, just a fraction of the cases briefed to COLLIER by defense counsel, and precisely 32 appellate cases more than Salisbury cited at trial!

Of the 32 cases cited above, 24 of the cases cited here were decided by the UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.

Were it not for the fact that COLLIER is COMPLETELY CORRUPT, one might be led to believe that COLLIER lacks the fundamental ability to read with comprehension!

THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS DECIDED ISSUES THAT COLLIER HAD PURPOSELY DECIDED WRONGLY MEANS THAT COLLIER HAS FORSAKEN A LEGAL OBLIGATION TO FOLLOW THEM, SINCE THEY ARE EFFECTIVELY THE LAW OF THE LAND. 

COLLIER, HOWEVER, IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THE HOLDINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT WITH THE INTENT TO RAILROAD AN INNOCENT MAN TO PRISON, CONTINUED TO PRESERVE HIS GRIP ON HIS LIFETIME, UNOPPOSED APPOINTMENT TO THE MEDINA COUNTY BENCH, COMPLIMENTS OF CORRUPT MEDINA COUNTY DEM PROSECUTOR DINO HOLMAN. 

MUCH MORE TO COME ....

  

THE WINDOW TO THE "SOUL" OF CORRUPT JUDGE COLLIER!

It is often said that the eyes are the window to the soul.  Whether or not that may be true, I would suggest that the only viable means to look into the soul of a judge is by simply gauging how closely he or she adheres to the law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence, and the Canons of Ethics.

Having posited that theory, I present here facts as to how well TOTALLY CORRUPT JUDGE CHRISTOPHER COLLIER has demonstrated that he is completely unfit to sit in judgment of anyone.

Following are my personal observation of what was purported to be a "trial" before COLLIER.

Collier Ignored and Violated Numerous Ohio Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure.  There are no Rules of Evidence enforced against the prosecutor by Collier. 

Following is a list of some, but not all, of the Rules, which COLLIER ignored and violated at “trial”:

Criminal Procedure Rule   1 : Scope of Rules: Applicability, etc.

Criminal Procedure Rule   3 : Complaint

Criminal Procedure Rule   4 : Warrant or Summons; Arrest

Criminal Procedure Rule   6 :  Grand Jury

Criminal Procedure Rule   7 :  The Indictment and the Information

Criminal Procedure Rule 12 :  Pleadings and Motions Before Trial

Criminal Procedure Rule 16 :  Discovery and Inspection

Criminal Procedure Rule 29 :  Motion for Acquittal

Criminal Procedure Rule 30 :  Instructions

Criminal Procedure Rule 31 :  Verdict

Criminal Procedure Rule 33 :  New Trial

Criminal Procedure Rule 46 :  Bail

Evidence Rule 101  :  Scope of Rules; Applicability, etc.

Evidence Rule 103  :  Rulings on Evidence

Evidence Rule 401  :  Relevant Evidence

Evidence Rule 402  :  Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible, etc.

Evidence Rule 403  :  Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice….

Evidence Rule 404  :  Character Evidence not Admissible to Prove Conduct, etc.

Evidence Rule 501  :  Privileges: General Rule

Evidence Rule 601  :  General Rule of Competency (of witnesses)

Evidence Rule 601(B) : Spouse Testifying

Evidence Rule 602  :  Lack of Personal Knowledge

Evidence Rule 605  :  Competency of Judge as Witness

Evidence Rule 607  :  Impeachment

Evidence Rule 609  :  Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime

Evidence Rule 611  :  Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation

Evidence Rule 615  :  Separation and Exclusion of Witnesses

Evidence Rule 616  :  Methods of Impeachment

Evidence Rule 704  :  Opinion on Ultimate Issue

         Further, COLLIER violated the following provisions of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct:

Canon 1:

         Rule 1.1         Compliance with the law

         Rule 1.2         Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary

Canon 2:

         Rule 2.2         Impartiality and Fairness

         Rule 2.3 (A), (B), C)  Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment

         Rule 2.4 (B), (C)  External Influences on Judicial Conduct

         Rule 2.5 (A)         Competence, Diligence, and Cooperation

         Rule 2.6 (A)         Ensuring the Right to be Heard

         Rule 2.8 (A), (B)  Decorum, Demeanor, and Communication with Jurors

         Rule 2.9 (A), (B)  Ex Parte Contacts

         Rule 2.10 (B)  Judicial Statements on Pending Cases

         Rule 2.15 (B)  Responding to Lawyer Misconduct

Should you wish to read these Rules and Canons, you may find them at these links:

The Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure can be found at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/criminal/CriminalProcedure.pdf

The Ohio Rules of Evidence can be found at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/evidence/evidence.pdf


The Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, which sets out the judicial canons of ethics, or in COLLIER's case, the lack thereof, can be found at
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/conduct/judcond0309.pdf

BASED UPON MY PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS, THE "SOUL" OF TOTALLY CORRUPT MEDINA COUNTY JUDGE COLLIER MUST BE A VERY DARK AND DESOLATE PLACE WITH ABSOLUTELY NO REDEEMING VALUE WHATSOEVER.


MUCH MORE TO COME ....