Thursday, January 27, 2011

"WE GOTTA ARREST HIM FOR SOMETHING, BUT I'M NOT SURE FOR WHAT!"


        Sheriff’s deputies, a total of eight in number, responded to the Flintstone residence, the first deputy arriving at 6:22 pm. Sheriff’s deputies established a perimeter and maintained surveillance of Defendant and Fred Flintstone, standing and talking in the driveway of the Flintstone residence, until about 7:00 pm when they arrested Defendant. 

        According to the sworn testimony of the deputies at the suppression hearing, they did not observe Defendant engage in any violent or criminal activity during that period of observation, nor did they observe Defendant enter or exit the Flintstone residence.

         So, while Wilma Flintstone was relating unfounded and unobserved information to the 911 dispatcher, including Mrs. Flintstone's claim that she heard “death rattles” coming from somewhere within her house, the deputies were simultaneously observing Defendant and Mr. Flintstone all the while talking peacefully in the driveway of the Flintstone residence.

         Any thinking, reasonably trained and prudent law enforcement officer should have immediately recognized that the information being reported by the dispatcher to them, via radio, did not jibe with their personal observations. 

         These circumstances alone should have required the deputies to stop, take stock of the situation, and conclude that additional inquiry and investigation was warranted to determine the facts before making an arrest.  After all, this isn't exactly ROCKET SCIENCE!

This fact alone is more than sufficient proof that common sense is not so common, particularly at the Medina County Sheriff's Office.  It's a bit frightening to think that these deputies are entrusted with loaded firearms.  

     In 1983, The United States Supreme Court decided the case of Illinois v. Gates, and held:

     " Our decisions applying the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis outlined above have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work. In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 269, we held that an affidavit relying on hearsay "is not to be deemed insufficient on that score so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented." We went on to say that, even in making a warrantless arrest, an officer" may rely upon information received through an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long as the informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer's knowledge."
Ibid. Likewise, we recognized the probative value of corroborative efforts of police officials in Aguilar -- the source of the "two-pronged test" -- by observing that, if the police had made some effort to corroborate the informant's report at issue, "an entirely different case" would have been presented. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 109, n. 1.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241-242 (1983)

A brief explanation of the facts and holdings in Illinois v. Gates cna be found at this link:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illinois_v._Gates

     In 1964, more than 40 years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Beck v. Ohio.

     In part, the Supreme Court held:

"Whether (an) arrest (is) constitutionally valid depends, in turn, upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it -- whether, at that moment, the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 338 U. S. 175-176; Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 361 U. S. 102."
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)

A basic explanation of the holding of the United States Supreme Court in the matter of Beck v Ohio can be found at this link: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beck_v._Ohio

In the case of this Defendant, the deputies not only failed to corroborate the reports of Wilma Flintstone coming from within the Flintstone home, but their actual observations at the scene refuted the ongoing telephone reports coming from Wilma, as they watched the Defendant and Fred Flintstone talking peacefully in the driveway of the Flintstone residence for nearly one full hour.


THESE UNSKILLED AND UNSCHOOLED DEPUTIES LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE DEFENDANT COMMITTED A CRIMINAL OFFENSE AT THE MOMENT OF ARREST, AND THEREAFTER!

IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT THESE DEPUTIES DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE MOST BASIC LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE.

BUT THEN AGAIN, NEITHER DOES COLLIER, WHO UPHELD THE UNLAWFUL ARREST, MADE BY DEPUTIES WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE.

COLLIER, WHO IS OBVIOUSLY NOT A DEEP THINKER, WAS MADE AWARE OF THE LAW BY DEFENSE COUNSEL, BUT RULED IN FAVOR OF SALISBURY SOLELY TO PRESERVE HIS UNCONTESTED LIFETIME APPOINTMENT TO THE MEDINA COUNTY COURT, COMPLIMENTS OF CORRUPT DEM PROSECUTOR DINO HOLMAN.

MUCH MORE TO COME ....

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