IN A PRIOR POST AT THIS BLOCK, THE BLOGGER CITED TO THE
COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OF "jUDGE WEASELPECKER" COLLIER FILED IN THE
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
IN THAT POST, THE BLOGGER POINTED OUT THAT
"WEASELPECKER" COLLIER VIOLATED NEARLY
ALL THE RULES GOVERNING COURTROOM PROCEDURE, ALL IN THE EFFORT TO UNLAWFULLY CONVICT A
FACTUALLY INNOCENT CITIZEN.
"WEASELPECKER'S" DELIBERATE RULES VIOLATIONS ONLY TELL ONE-HALF OF THE STORY.
IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (OBVIOUSLY NOT INCLUDING MEDINA COUNTY), STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAL, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO SUPREME COURTS, HAVE INTERPRETED THE CONSTITUTION(S) AND APPLIED THOSE INTERPRETATIONS TO A MYRIAD NUMBER OF CASES, ESTABLISHING A BODY OF
PRECEDENT THAT
LOWER COURTS ARE BOUND TO FOLLOW. OBVIOUSLY,
"WEASELPECKER" COLLIER SEEMS TO OVERLOOK THAT
PROVISO OF THE LAW.
SHOWN BELOW, TAKEN FROM THE
COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OF "jUDGE WEASELPECKER" COLLIER FILED IN THE
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, IDENTIFY SOME, BUT NOT ALL,
OF THE
CONTROLLING DECISIONS OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS, INCLUDING THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THAT "WEASELPECKER" DELIBERATELY IGNORED.
Collier’s rulings ignored and contravened the prevailing law, including precedents and holdings of the United States Supreme Court, despite having been fully briefed on the law by defense counsel.
The prosecutor cited no law during these proceedings. Following are some, but not all, of the cases that Collier, despite having been fully briefed on them, simply ignored in “fixing” this case for the county prosecutor:
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)
- “Constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. *** It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.”
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-406 (1965)
- The right of cross-examination, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
- Evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not admissible at trial
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)
- “When police conduct a warrantless search, the state bears the burden of establishing the validity of the search.”
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.14 (1967)
- Sixth Amendment right of a defendant to compulsory process extends to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-62 (2004)
- “The Confrontation Clause commands, not that the evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-318 (1974)
- Denial of the “right of effective cross-examination” is “constitutional error of the first magnitude” requiring automatic reversal
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895)
- It is the duty of the court (not the prosecutor) to expound the law, and the jury to apply the facts to the law, otherwise the stability of justice and personal rights are jeopardized
Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005)
- “It is…elementary law, federal and state, that the judge bears ultimate responsibility for instructing a lay jury in the law.”
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
- State’s obligation to disclose information and evidence favorable to the defendant
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)
- “… the Court has consistently held that a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair,[Footnote 8] and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.”
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, Fn 7 (1976), citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
- Due process of law “cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a state to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation.”
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, Fn 8 (1985)
- “…the Brady rule has its roots in a series of cases dealing with convictions based on the prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony. In Mooney v. Holohan, (1935), the Court established the rule that the knowing use by a state prosecutor of perjured testimony to obtain a conviction and the deliberate suppression of evidence that would have impeached and refuted the testimony constitutes a denial of due process.”
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 307 (1966)]
- Government invasion of the defense camp compels conviction to be set aside as constitutionally defective
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241 (1983)
- Probable cause, to be determined on the totality of the circumstances, requires corroboration of a tip by independent police work/investigation
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971)
- Criminal complaint not setting out a statement of essential facts does not pass constitutional muster
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724 (1969)
- There is no exception to the rule that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible at trial
Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987)
- “We have recognized that "some constitutional rights [are] so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S., at 23. The right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge or jury, is such a right.”
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 172-173 (1997)
- “As to a criminal defendant, Rule 403's term "unfair prejudice" speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the fact finder into declaring guilt on an improper basis rather than on proof specific to the offense charged. Such improper grounds certainly include generalizing from a past bad act that a defendant is by propensity the probable perpetrator of the current crime. Thus, Rule 403 requires that the relative probative value of prior conviction evidence be balanced against its prejudicial risk of misuse. A judge should balance these factors not only for the item in question but also for any actually available substitutes. If an alternative were found to have substantially the same or greater probative value but a lower danger of unfair prejudice, sound judicial discretion would discount the value of the item first offered and exclude it if its discounted probative value were substantially outweighed by unfairly prejudicial risk. Pp. 180-185.”
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, at 14 (2006)
- “Through the in limine procedure, the (courts) should redact or exclude the portions of any statement that have become testimonial, as they do, for example, with unduly prejudicial portions of otherwise admissible evidence.”
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)
- Individual cannot be compelled to testify against a spouse
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, at syllabus ¶ 2
- “Criminal defendants have the right under the Compulsory Process Clause to the government’s assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial, and the right to put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt.”
Holloway v. Florida, 449 U.S. 905, 907 (1980)
- “Thus the Court more than once has expressed the understanding that a lesser-included-offense (instruction) minimizes the risk of undermining the reasonable-doubt standard.”
Sansone v. United States, 330 U.S. 343, 349 (1965)
- “In a case where some elements of the crime charged themselves constitute a lesser crime, if the evidence justified it, would no doubt be entitled to an instruction which would permit a finding of guilt of the lesser offense.”
State v. Morris, 2007-Ohio-3591, at ¶ 37
- In the prosecution for alleged violations of 2911.11 ORC, “due process requires that the particularized nature of the accused’s conduct includes the behavior that demonstrates he committed an underlying offense.”
State v. Hous, 2004-Ohio-666, at ¶ 11
- “…jury instructions given at the end of a trial cannot relate back to give an accused adequate notice of the charges against which an accused must defend….”
State v. Hubbard, 2004-Ohio-5204, at ¶ 6
- “Under Evid.R. 602, a witness may testify only to those matters of which he has personal knowledge…gained through firsthand observation or experience and actually perceived the subject matter of his testimony.”
State v. Taylor, (1993) 66 Ohio St. 3d 295, 300-301
- “For a purported excited utterance to be admissible there must have been: …(4) the declarant must have personally observed the event.”
Cox v. Oliver Machinery Co., (1987) 41 Ohio App. 3d 28, at 35-36
- “The key to the statement’s trustworthiness is the spontaneity of the statement, either contemporaneous with the event or immediately thereafter.”
State v. Mitchell, 2007-Ohio-1696, at ¶ 19
- “The Ohio Supreme Court has recently affirmed that recordings of 911 calls that were made to avoid immediate danger are not testimonial and do not violate the Confrontation Clause when the declarant is not available to testify at trial.”
State v. Henness (1997), 79 Ohio St. 3d 53, ¶ 1 of the syllabus
- “…the testifying spouse remains incompetent *** until she makes a deliberate choice to testify, with knowledge of her right to refuse. The trial court must take an active role in determining competency, and must make an affirmative determination on the record that the spouse has elected to testify.”
State v. Hunt (1994), 97 Ohio App. 3d 372, holding that a cross-examiner may not make testimonial assertions under the pretext of asking a question
GIVEN ALL OF THE HOLDINGS AND DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ("U. S." CITATIONS) TO WHICH "WEASELPECKER" TURNED A BLIND EYE, ANY DISINTERESTED PERSON WOULD SUSPECT THAT PHILANDERING, ILLEGITIMATE "jUDGE WEASELPECKER" COLLIER IS UNDER THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT MEDINA COUNTY HAS SECEDED FROM THE UNION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT CONTROL PROCEEDINGS IN THE "COURTS" OF THE MEDINA COUNTY "JUSTUS" SYSTEM!
NOW, READERS MAY BE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT "WEASELPECKER" COLLIER IS IGNORANT OF THE LAW. WHILE THAT IS UNABASHEDLY TRUE THAT "WEASELPECKERIS AN IGNORANT BASTARD, PARTICULARLY IN MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE LAW, "WEASELECKER" WAS BRIEFED ON EACH OF THE ABOVE-CASES IN THE CASE BEFORE HIM.
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW BY "WEASELPECKER"
COLLIER IS NO DEFENSE TO PUBLIC
CORRUPTION !!!
NO ONE CAN DISPUTE THE FACT THAT
"WEASELPECKER" COLLIER IS A CORRUPT "PUBLIC
"OFFICIAL" AND A CROOK !!!
